ABSTRACT In delay tolerant networks (DTNs), the delivery rate and delivery speed are restricted by node selfishness. To promote the delivery rate and reduce the delivery delay in DTNs, we propose a hybrid incentive trade model (HITM), which uses reputation compensation to stimulate nodes to give up their temporary benefits and transfer their forwarding missions to other more qualified nodes. Furthermore, HITM gives credit payment and reputation promotion to nodes whose mission transferring behaviors are capable of reducing delivery delay or promoting delivery reliability, and conversely punishes nodes whose mission transferring behaviors could prolong the delivery delay or impair the delivery reliability. Tracedriven experiments are performed to compare HITM with previous representative incentive schemes. The experiment results demonstrate that the HITM can effectively limit node selfishness, thereby promoting the delivery rate as well as reducing the delivery delay.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs), data is exchanged in a store-carry-forward manner [1] - [4] . This kind of manner relies on the hypothesis that DTN nodes are willing to cooperate with each other in data forwarding and storing. However, it may exist that some selfish DTN nodes refuse to share their own limited buffers and computing resources [5] . These selfish behaviors can bring negative effects on performances in DTNs, such as impairing delivery rate and prolonging delivery delay [6] . Therefore, how to solve the node selfishness problem efficiently and effectively becomes a significant and challenging issue in DTNs.
To restrict selfish behaviors and stimulate nodes to join in cooperation of forwarding in DTNs, incentive schemes have been studied, which mainly include reputation based schemes, credit based schemes and hybrid schemes. The reputation based schemes take neighborhood monitoring or overhearing to collect reputation information of nodes and detect their selfish behaviors according to this information [7] - [10] . The credit based schemes use online or offline virtual currency to reward nodes according to their contribution to cooperation [11] - [14] . The hybrid schemes combine both the advantages of reputation based schemes and credit based schemes [17] , [18] .
Due to the lack of contemporaneous paths in DTNs, to stimulate nodes to forward data to other nodes with higher possibilities of meeting the destination nodes, some existing incentive schemes only reward the nodes on the success delivering paths. To further promote fairness, PI [17] provides a hybrid incentive scheme, which not only rewards credits to nodes on the success delivering paths, but also gives reputation payment to nodes on the failed paths for their contribution to cooperation.
However, it is not always helpful to stimulate nodes to pursue more benefits. For example, a relay node takes a forwarding mission from a source node, and on its way to the mission's destination subarea, it meets another node who has the same possibility to pass by the destination subarea but can reach the destination subarea earlier. In this situation, if this relay node wants to pursue more temporary benefits, it may refuse to transfer the mission to the other node. But if it can give up the temporary benefit from this mission and transfer the mission to the other more qualified node, the delivery delay for this mission will be reduced.
In fact, the existing incentive schemes have not mentioned how to stimulate nodes to give up their temporary benefits for long term cooperation, in this paper, we propose a Hybrid Incentive Trade Model (HITM) for data forwarding in DTNs, which uses reputation compensation to stimulate nodes to give up their temporary benefits and transfer their forwarding missions to other more qualified nodes.
In HITM, the nodes offering forwarding missions are defined as Service Users (SUs) and the nodes willing to take forwarding missions are defined as Service Providers (SPs). The SUs can choose their desired SPs according to the SPs' reputation values and travelling speeds, and transfer their forwarding missions to their desired SPs. Further, due to the high variation of node mobility in DTNs, HITM allows nodes to have different kinds of mission transferring behaviors, and especially encourages the mission transferring behaviors capable of promoting delivery reliability and reducing delivery delay.
Our contributions can be mainly summarized as follows.
(1) To reduce delivery delay, we set a threshold of waiting time and define two kinds of SPs: the first kind SPs have great possibilities to pass through the destination subareas where the destination nodes stay; and the second kind SPs will not pass through but move close to the destination subareas. When a SU searches a SP, if it can not find the first kind SP within the threshold of waiting time, it will select and resort to the second kind SP. (2) To improve the efficiency of SP selection, we require each node to generate a Daily Routine Table (DRT) by analyzing its user's mobility pattern information, so that the two kinds of SPs can be easily found according to their DRTs. (3) We also design an incentive scheme in HITM to determine different kinds of mission transferring behaviors between nodes and execute different punishments or rewards to them. In the incentive scheme, the SUs whose mission transferring behaviors are capable of reducing delivery delay or promoting delivery reliability can get credit rewards and reputation promotion; otherwise, they get punishment. (4) For stimulating nodes to transfer their missions to other more qualified nodes, we hereby use reputation promotion to compensate the SUs which sacrifice their temporary benefits for cooperation, and make the reputation promotion proportional to their sacrificed benefits and related to their future credit payment. HITM can be applied in a cloud computing environment, in which cloud technologies are used to collect and process the mobility information of nodes, and also provide data supports for forwarding mission trades between nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, an overview of related work is presented. In Section 3, we define the network model and trade model. Details of HITM are elaborated in Section 4. Performances of HITM are evaluated and analyzed in Section 5. We draw conclusions and give future research directions in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
To promote cooperation among nodes, many incentive schemes have been proposed, which can be roughly classified into three categories: reputation based schemes [7] - [10] , credit based schemes [11] - [14] and hybrid schemes [15] - [18] .
In the reputation based scheme, each node records reputation information of its encounters according to their behaviors. The reputation of a node will increase if the node contributes to cooperation, and conversely, if the node acts selfishly, the reputation will decrease. Therefore, the reputation information is helpful to detect and restrain uncooperative nodes. Reference [7] provides a protocol of bundle forwarding and mechanism of node behavior recording for obtaining, storing and communicating reputation statistics. Reference [8] designs a reputation manager composed of a statistics module, a computation module, and a response module, which records confirmed and total forwarding times, computes both direct reputation and indirect reputation, and detects selfish nodes with a reputation threshold. Different from the reputation based schemes based on neighbors' monitoring results and scoring targets, MobiGame [9] is a dynamic reputation system supporting self-maintained reputation, in other words, it allows each relay node keeps its own relay evidence for the future reputation clearance, which to some extent improves the stability for applications in opportunistic communication environment of DTNs. MobiID [10] also allows each node to manage its own reputation evidence and show to demonstrate its reputation whenever necessary, which also defines the concepts of self-check and community-check to speed up reputation establishment.
In the credit based scheme, nodes pay for forwarding services offered by others and earn credits by providing forwarding services. Some of them take online authority to deal with payment management, but others mainly introduce layered coins issued by offline credit authority. SMART [11] is a secure credit based incentive scheme in which each intermediate forwarding node adds its ID into the forwarded packet so that its destination node can report nodes who have forwarded the packet to a credit management center. Mobicent [12] provides different payment mechanisms for catering to the client who wants to minimize either payment or data delivery delay. Multicent [13] regards the packet exchange between two nodes as a packet forwarding game and designs a payoff function for the game to assign different credits according to different priorities defined in the corresponding routing strategy. In [14] , the reward to each node is calculated based on its contribution time on the earliest delivery path and all rewards for a successful delivery are paid by its source node.
The hybrid scheme combines both the advantages of reputation based scheme and credit based scheme, and has been studied in the mobile ad hoc networks previously. ARM [15] integrates resource and price systems by enabling X. He et al.: HITM for Data Forwarding in DTNs higher-reputed nodes to pay less for their received services. To avoid the manipulation of wealthy nodes, [16] only provides incentives to encourage nodes to keep their reputation values just above the reputation threshold rather than encouraging them to be more cooperative in packet forwarding.
However, due to the unique features of DTNs, such as frequent partitioning and lack of end-to-end contemporaneous paths, the hybrid schemes for mobile ad hoc networks are not suitable for DTNs. PI [17] provides a hybrid incentive scheme for DTNs, in the scheme, if and only if the bundles arrive at the destination node, the intermediate forwarding nodes can get credits from the source node and the credits are related to their reputations; for the failure of bundle forwarding, those intermediate forwarding nodes still can get good reputation values from a trusted authority. Zhang and Van [18] also disclose a hybrid incentive scheme for social cloud systems to perform rewards and punishments to nodes according to their reputations.
Though the above schemes are effective on encouraging cooperation of nodes, none of them mentions how to stimulate nodes to sacrifice their temporary benefits for long term cooperation.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND TRADE MODEL A. NETWORK MODEL 1) NETWORK DESCRIPTION
We assume a DTN consisting of mobile nodes having limited communication range and storage space. The mobile nodes are attached on users and move with them, denoted by N i . Enlightened by the network models in [19] - [21] , we choose hot spots (such as popular buildings) where the nodes visit frequently as landmarks. The landmarks are assumed to be distributed relatively evenly. We divide the whole DTN into subareas according to the landmarks. The subareas are denoted by A i . Specifically, as shown in Fig. 1 , each subarea contains at least one landmark (the circle dots are mobile nodes and the red triangles are landmarks). Each landmark is a central station having large storage space and powerful processing capability. While a node enters or leaves a subarea, it is required to report its entering time and leaving time to the landmark of the subarea so that the landmark can record its visiting records. The landmarks cannot communicate with each other directly, but through the mobile nodes, they can communicate with each other indirectly and have responsibility to store and process the information sent by the mobile nodes. The landmarks could be local cloud centers capable of collecting the mobile nodes' mobility information and generating their Daily Routine Tables (DRTs) .
In each subarea, if the distance between a node and a landmark is less than the node's transmission range, the node can communicate with the landmark directly, otherwise, the node has to communicate with the landmark indirectly through others nodes moving close to the landmark.
2) DAILY ROUTINE TABLE (DRT)
Since the mobile nodes can move with their users, their mobility patterns are influenced by their users' social behaviors [22] . To obtain the nodes' mobility patterns, each node is required to record its user's daily routine information. The daily routine information includes the subareas where the user usually visits and the corresponding time when it enters and leaves these subareas. Each node is also required to analyze its user's daily routine information to generate a Daily Routine Table (DRT), and update its own DRT periodically.
As shown in Table 1 , a node's DRT shows the preferred subareas where it visits frequently or stays in habitually, the corresponding staying intervals and the staying probabilities in these preferred subareas. The DRT also records the node's possible transiting routes from one preferred subarea to another. c) Staying probability: A node's staying probability in a subarea in an interval depends on the average time it stays in this subarea in the interval. For example, if the average time of N i staying in A m in interval T i n is T i n (A m ), its staying probability in A m in interval T i n is P S n,i (A m ), which can be calculated as:
d) Possible transiting route: For a node, there may be more than one possible transiting route from one preferred subarea to another. So here DRT records its all possible transiting routes.
B. TRADE MODEL
We also define a trade model among the mobile nodes, which includes Virtual Bank (VB), Service User (SU) and Service Provider (SP). In the trade model, the node offering forwarding missions is defined as Service User (SU) and the node willing to take forwarding missions is defined as Service Provider (SP). The SU can transfer its forwarding missions to the SP, the SP can earn credit by taking forwarding missions, and the VB is the third party for ensuring safe and fair mission transferring between the SU and the SP.
1) VIRTUAL BANK (VB)
In each landmark, we install a Virtual Bank (VB), which is in charge of data storage, encryption, reputation update and credit payment. The VBs in the DTN are denoted by VB i . They can synchronize data indirectly through mobile nodes periodically. In fact, each landmark can act as a local cloud center, and the cloud computing technology can be used to provide data support for the VBs. Each node can register in the system of VBs to get a unique Virtual Bank Account (VBA) for storing its reputation value and virtual credits earned from forwarding missions. In the registration process, each node has to submit its DRT to the system of VBs. And to confirm the authenticity of a node's DRT, the system of VBs will check its visiting records in its preferred subareas.
For a node in the registration process, it is also required to provide at least one recipient address to the system of VBs. While delivering data from a source node N S to a destination node N D , the VBs act like post offices and make sure data is forwarded by relay nodes (SPs) from a subarea to another until to the recipient address of N D (the relay nodes are denoted by N Ri ) safely and successfully, as shown in Fig. 2 .
The system of VBs sets a reputation threshold for all nodes. If a node's reputation is lower than the threshold, it will not be allowed to make trades through VBs. After the registration, each node is assigned an original reputation that is higher than the threshold. The nodes can promote their reputation through making contribution to cooperation.
2) SERVICE USER (SU) AND SERVICE PROVIDER (SP)
After registering in the system of VBs, each node can act as a Service User (SU) to provide or transfer forwarding missions to other nodes, as well as a Service Provider (SP) to take forwarding missions from other nodes. The SUs and SPs in the same subarea can make trades of forwarding missions through the VB in this subarea.
As shown in Fig. 3 , if a SU wants to provide or transfer a forwarding mission, it should firstly send a service request to a nearby VB, which then makes service pushes to SPs around on receiving this request. The SPs will select their desired forwarding missions according to their received service pushes and send the selection results back to the VB so that it can generate a service response for the SU. After the SU gets the service response, it could make a service order. There are two modes for SPs in the forwarding mission selection. The first mode is for SPs that are moving on possible transiting routes recorded in their DRTs (Each node in the DTN moves randomly and is required to record its own trajectory, thus it can distinguish which transiting route it is on when necessary). In the first mode, a SP only needs to choose the forwarding missions on its current transiting route, and once deviating from its current transiting route, it will transfer the unaccomplished forwarding missions on its current transiting route to other nodes. If a SP is moving on the overlap part between two possible transiting routes, it can choose any forwarding mission on both of the routes, but when it crosses the overlap part and moves toward only one route, it has to transfer its selected and unaccomplished missions on the other route.
The second mode is for SPs that are staying in their preferred subareas. In the second mode, a SP does not know which transiting route it will take, and for pursuing more benefits, it can choose a profitable transiting route as its desired transiting route according to its received service pushes, and then select the forwarding missions on this desired transiting route. Once a SP finds that it is not moving on its desired transiting route, it has to transfer its selected forwarding missions on this desired route.
To ensure delivery reliability and avoid malicious competition, a SP is only allowed to select the forwarding For high variation of node mobility in DTNs, a SP may change its transiting route at any time, and even if the forwarding missions on its current transiting route have not been accomplished yet, the SP is allowed to turn into a SU and transfer the unaccomplished forwarding missions to other SPs.
There is another pressure which can force a SP to change into a SU and transfer its missions out. The pressure is that, in this trade model, the reputation of each node is configured to attenuate over time (which will be discussed in Section 4). In other words, if a node wants to survive in this trade model, it needs to keep its reputation higher than the reputation threshold. And for a node, the important way to get reputation promotion is to make mission transferring capable of promoting delivery reliability and reducing delivery delay (which will be discussed in detail in Section 4).
IV. DETAILS OF HITM
In this section, we discuss how the Hybrid Incentive Trade Model (HITM) is used to help nodes to make trades in detail. In HITM, through trades, SUs can transfer their forwarding missions to SPs. HITM also provides an incentive scheme to determine different kinds of mission transferring behaviors during the trades.
In the incentive scheme, for a node, its positive mission transferring behavior is beneficial for its reputation promotion, and in turn, its good reputation is favorable to obtaining more benefits in future trades. The incentive scheme gives credit rewards and reputation promotions to nodes whose mission transferring behaviors are capable of reducing delivery delay or promoting delivery reliability, and executes punishment to the transferring behaviors impairing the delivery rate or delivery reliability. Especially, for the nodes that would transfer their missions to other more qualified nodes, the incentive scheme will compensate them with reputation promotion that is proportional to their sacrificed benefits.
A. PROCESS OF HITM
According to Fig. 3 , the trade process in HITM mainly includes six steps: service request, service push, forwarding mission selection, service response, service order, and contract. In order to lay the ground work for the incentive scheme, we firstly describe the trade process of HITM step by step.
1) SERVICE REQUEST
If a node wants to offer or transfer a forwarding mission to other nodes, as a SU, it will send a service request to a nearby VB at first for finding appropriate SPs. The service request must include the recipient address of the destination node in this forwarding mission.
For a source node, its request will be accepted only when its reputation value is higher than the reputation threshold and its credit is enough to pay a deposit, otherwise, its request will be rejected. For a relay node, if its reputation is higher than the reputation threshold, its request will be accepted, no matter how much credit it has.
2) SERVICE PUSH
When a VB accepts a service request from a SU, it extracts the recipient address from the request, subsequently obtains the destination subarea which the recipient address belongs to, and then selects appropriate SPs for this SU according to the destination subarea.
We here define two kinds of SPs. The first kind SPs have possible transiting routes which will pass through the destination subarea and the second kind SPs will not pass through the destination subarea but get chances to move close to it. Accordingly, each VB can generate two kinds of service pushes for these two kinds of SPs, respectively.
For generating service pushes for a request, a VB firstly finds out the first kind SPs in its subarea for the request according to the DRTs and visiting records all it has, subsequently it calculates three parameters: the total number of the first kind SPs, the average time the first kind SPs will take to reach the destination subarea, and the average reputation of the first kinds SPs, then it puts these parameters in the request's first kind service pushes. For example, for a SU N i to request delivering data to destination subarea A i , the above parameters for its first kind SPs are denoted by n 1 i , t i and re 1 i , respectively, and so the parameters A i , n 1 i , t i and re 1 i will be put in its first kind service pushes.
After a VB sends a request's first kind service pushes to SPs around, it waits for the feedback from the SPs. To avoid the VB waiting too long, we set a waiting time threshold T t W . Therefore, if the VB gets no feedback for the request's first kind service pushes within T t W , the VB will change to search the second kind SPs in its subarea for this request. Then the VB calculates the total number of the second kind SPs, the average travelling speed the second kind SPs will use to move close to the destination subarea, and the average reputation of the second kind SPs, and also puts these parameters in the request's second kind service pushes. For example, for a SU N i to request delivering data to destination subarea A i , the above parameters for its second kind SPs are denoted by n 2 i , v i and re 2 i respectively, so the parameters A i , n 2 i , v i and re 2 i will be put in its second kind service pushes.
3) FORWARDING MISSION SELECTION
As defined in the previous section, in HITM, a SP can switch between two modes while selecting forwarding missions. If a SP is moving on a transiting route in its DRT, it can choose the first mode, in which it just needs to select the forwarding missions on this current transiting route, and sends the selection result back to its nearby VB. If a SP is staying in one of its preferred subareas, it can choose the second mode, in which it selects a desired transiting route bringing more benefits from all possible transiting routes in its DRT according to the service pushes it has received, and then selects forwarding missions on this route. Here, we give an example in Fig. 4 to discuss how a SP selects its desired transiting route in the second mode. For a SP having two possible transiting routes from subarea A 1 to subarea A 9 (the first one is A 1 → A 5 → A 6 → A 9 and the second one is
, when it receives three service pushes which request forwarding data to subareas A 5 , A 6 on the first possible transiting route, as well as the subarea A 7 on the second possible transiting route, respectively, in the second mode, the SP will choose the first possible transiting route as its desired transiting route if the forwarding missions on this route can bring more benefits.
To evaluate the profit on each possible transiting route, we define profit weights for service pushes. For a first kind service push to request forwarding data to subarea A i , its profit weight is denoted by w 1 i , and for a second kind service push with destination subarea A i , its profit weight is denoted by w 2 i . Both of the profit weights w 1 i and w 2 i can be calculated by SPs according to the parameters included in the service pushes.
For instance, after a SP N j receiving a service push to request forwarding data to subarea A i , if it is a first kind service push, N j calculates w 1 i according to formula (2); if it is a second kind service push, N j calculates w 2 i according to formula (3) .
Where, T ij is the time N j will take to reach subarea A i , V ij is the traveling speed of N j moving close to subarea A i , and Re j is the reputation value of N j .
If the SP N j has received m first kind service pushes (their corresponding destination subareas are A 1 , A 2 . . . . . . .A m ) and n second kind service pushes (their corresponding destination subareas are A m+1 , A m+2 . . . . . . .A m+n ) on a possible transiting route, the total profit on this route is w Total , which can be calculated as follows.
Where D 1 i is the distance from N j 's current subarea to destination subarea A i on the possible transiting route, D 2 i is the distance from N j 's current subarea to a subarea on the possible transiting route that is most close to destination subarea A i . P 1 i and P 2 i denote the possibilities of N j to obtain the two kinds of forwarding missions, which can be calculated according to formula (5) and formula (6), respectively.
In the second mode of forwarding mission selection, a SP can choose a possible transiting route with the greatest total profit as its desired transiting route, and select the forwarding missions on this route.
4) SERVICE RESPONSE AND SERVICE ORDER
Each VB collects forwarding mission selection results from SPs around, to generate service responses. For a SU who requests forwarding data from its current subarea to subarea A i , if a nearby VB gets forwarding mission selection results about its request, the VB will generate a service response for it. And the service response includes parameters of the SPs who are willing to take the forwarding mission in this request. Here if the SPs are the first kind SPs, the service response includes their reputation values (denoted by Re j , j = 1, 2, 3 . . . .n), their average reputation (denoted by Re 1 i ), the time each of them will take to reach subarea A i (denoted by T ij , j = 1, 2, 3 . . . .n) and the average time they will take to reach subarea A i (denoted by T i ); If the SPs are the second kind SPs, the service response includes their reputation values (denoted by Re j , j = 1, 2, 3 . . . .n), their average reputation (denoted by Re 2 i ), the traveling speed each of them will use to move close to subarea A i (denoted by V ij , j = 1, 2, 3 . . . .n) and the average traveling speed of them moving close to subarea A i (denoted by V i ). The SU can choose its desired SP according to the parameters in its received service response.
If the SU is a source node to offer a forwarding mission, it will choose a SP with the greatest W 1 i or W 2 i as its desired SP, wherein W 1 i and W 2 i can be calculated according to formula (7) and formula (8), respectively.
If the SU is a relay node who wants to transfer its forwarding mission to other nodes, it can choose a SP that will bring more reputation reward or less reputation punishment as its desired SP. The method of calculating the reputation reward and punishment will be discussed in the incentive scheme in part B.
After the SU selecting its desired SP, it sends a service order including this desired SP to its nearby VB, and waits for the VB making a contract between its desired SP and itself.
5) CONTRACT
Once a VB receives a service order for transferring a forwarding mission from a SU to its desired SP, the VB will make a contract between the SU and its desired SP. While making the contract, an incentive scheme is performed, in which the reward or punishment caused by the mission transferring behavior in this service order is calculated. And there are two different situations in the contract making.
Situation 1: If the SU is a source node initiating a forwarding mission, the SU should pay a deposit to the VB. The deposit value depends on the distance from the SU's current subarea to the destination subarea in the forwarding mission. When the forwarding mission is accomplished successfully, the system of VBs will compute the total credit payments for all intermediate relay nodes. According to the difference between the total credit cost and the deposit, the SU can retreat more and must fill less.
Situation 2: If the SU is a relay node and just wants to transfer its forwarding mission to other nodes, the VB will analyze its mission transferring behavior and use the incentive scheme to perform reward or punishment to it. Specifically, in case the SU was a first kind SP when it took the forwarding mission, and if it transfers the mission to another first kind SP who can reach the corresponding destination subarea earlier, it will get reputation promotion, otherwise it will get reputation punishment; In case the SU was a second kind SP when it took the forwarding mission , and if it transfers the mission to a first kind SP or a second kind SP who can move close to the corresponding destination subarea faster, it will get reputation promotion, otherwise it will get reputation punishment.
While a VB makes a contract between a SU and a SP for transferring a forwarding mission, it needs to pack the parameters of the SP into this forwarding mission. These parameters will be used by the system of VBs, for the mission's next trade and payment clearance in the future. For ensuring safety and authenticity, these parameters should be packed by the VB rather than the SP itself.
For example, when a VB transfers a forwarding mission with destination subarea A i from a SU to a SP N j , if N j is a first kind SP for this mission, the VB should pack N j 's reputation value (denoted by Re j ), the distance of N j 's transiting route (or desired transiting route) from its current subarea to subarea A i (denoted by D 1 ij ), the time N j will take to reach subarea A i (denoted by T ij ) into the forwarding mission, as well as the average reputation value of all the first kind SPs willing to take the forwarding mission (denoted by Re 1 i ) and the average time these first kind SPs will take to reach subarea A i (denoted by T i ).
But if N j is a second kind SP, the VB should pack N j 's reputation value (denoted by Re j ), the distance from N j 's current subarea to a subarea on N j 's transiting route (or desired transiting route) that is most close to A i (denoted by D 2 ij ), the speed N j will use to move close to subarea A i (denoted by V ij ) into the forwarding mission, as well as the average reputation value of all the second kind SPs willing to take the forwarding mission (denoted by Re 2 i ) and the average speed these second kind SPs will use to move close to subarea A i (denoted by V i ).
The VB also needs to pack the time making the contract and its subarea into the forwarding mission, to show when and where the SP takes the mission, respectively.
B. INCENTIVE SCHEME IN HITM
We take Algorithm 1 as an example to show how to perform the incentive scheme while making a contract between a SU and its desired SP. In Algorithm 1, a mission to request forwarding data to a destination subarea A i is denoted by M i , and while a SU N p transfers M i to its desired SP N q , the incentive scheme needs to determine which case (case 1 to case 6) N p 's transferring mission behavior belongs to according to its effect on delivery reliability and delivery delay, then execute the corresponding reward or punishment to it.
Additionally, how to determine another four different cases (case 7 to case 10) in the destination subarea will be discussed in Part C.
In order to clearly describe the incentive scheme in Algorithm 1 and Part C, a list of notations is defined in Table 2 .
1) CASE 1 AND CASE 2
In both case 1 and case 2, the SU N p was a first kind SP when it took the mission M i , its desired SP N q is also a first kind SP for the mission M i in the current trade, and N p wants to transfer M i to N q via its nearby VB.
While the nearby VB making the contract between N p and N q , it firstly checks the corresponding parameters of the desired SP N q : T iq , Re q , T i , D 1 iq and Re 1 i , then extracts the historical parameters of N p which have been packed in
, and performs the incentive scheme. In the incentive scheme, the time span from T 0 (N p )(A i ) to the starting time of the current trade is denoted by T F , and the distance the SU N p has traveled in the time span T F is denoted by D F .
If T F + T iq < T 0 ip , which means N q will reach subarea A i earlier than N p , and this situation is determined as case 1. In case 1, N p 's mission transferring behavior is helpful to reduce delivery time, but N p needs to give up part of credit payment from M i . We denote the delivery time reduced by the mission transferring in case 1 as T 1 s , and calculate it from formula (9) . We also denote the credit that the SU N p needs to sacrifice in case 1 as C1 s , and calculate it from formula (10). Input parameters of SU N p and SP N q ; 2: if (N p is a source node ) // This is Situation 1
3:
N p pays a deposit; 4: else if (N p was a first kind SP) // This is Situation 2 5: if (N q is a first kind SP) 6 : 
Re6 is the reputation punishment forN p in Case 6 16: end if 17: else if (N p was a second kind SP) // This is Situation 2 18: if (N q is a second kind SP) 19 : 
end if
In case 1, the incentive scheme gives the SU N p reputation reward (denoted by Re1) for compensating its sacrificed benefit, and gives N p credit payment (denoted by Cr1) that is proportional to the distance it has travelled after it took mission M i (denoted by D F ). Specifically, the reputation reward Re1 is related to N p 's sacrificed benefit C1 s and the reduced delivery time T 1 s . Cr1 and Re1 are calculated in formula (11) and formula (12) , respectively. Where α and β are coefficients related to credit cost and delivery time respectively, which can be adjusted by the system of VBs according to its needs.
If T 0 ip ≤ T F + T iq , it means that the SP N q can not reach A i earlier than N p , this situation is defined as case 2. In case 2, although N q may prolong the delivery delay, the SU N p still wants to transfer M i to N q , probably for the reason that N p has to change its transiting route. Besides prolonging delivery time, N p ' mission transferring behavior in case 2 may also increase delivery credit cost to M i 's source node. The possible prolonged delivery time and increased delivery credit cost in case 2 are denoted by T 2 w and C2 w , which are calculated in formula (13) and formula (14) , respectively. 
In case 2, for N p 's mission transferring behavior causing the prolonged delivery time T 2 w and increased credit cost C2 w , the incentive scheme gives N p reputation punishment (denoted by Re2), and deducts the increased credit cost C2 w from N p 's credit payment (denoted by Cr2).
Cr2 and Re2 are calculated in formula (15) and formula (16), respectively. Generally, the longer the prolonged delivery time T 2 w and the more increased credit cost C2 w , the greater the reputation punishment Re2.
2) CASE 3 AND CASE 4
In both case 3 and case 4, the SU N p was a second kind SP when it took the mission M i , its desired SP N q is also a second kind SP for M i in the current trade.
If N p wants to transfer M i to N q through a nearby VB, the VB firstly checks the corresponding parameters of the
iq and Re 2 i , then extracts the historical parameters of N p which have been packed in
, to perform the incentive scheme.
If V iq > V 0 ip , it means that the SP N q will move close to subarea A i faster than N p , this situation is defined as case 3.
In case 3, N p transfers M i to N q who can move close to A i faster and sacrifices part of benefit from this mission. The delivery time reduced by N q in case 3 is denoted by T 3 s and calculated in formula (17) . The credit that the SU N p needs to sacrifice in case 3 is denoted by C3 s and calculated in formula (18) .
In case 3, because N p 's mission transferring behavior is helpful to reduce delivery time, the incentive scheme rewards N p reputation promotion (denoted by Re3) and also gives it credit payment (denoted by Cr3) proportional to the distance N p has travelled after taking the mission (denoted by D F ). The reputation promotion Re3 and credit payment Cr3 are calculated in formula (19) and formula (20) , respectively.
If V iq ≤ V 0 ip , it means that the SP N q can not move close to A i faster than N p , this situation is defined as case 4. In case 4, probably due to changing transiting route, N p has to transfer M i to N q . The credit deduction and prolonged delivery time in case 4 are denoted by C4 w and T 4 w , which are calculated in formula (21) and formula (22) 
In case 4, for N p 's mission transferring behavior causing the prolonged delivery time T 4 w , the incentive scheme gives N p reputation punishment (denoted by Re4), and deducts C4 w from N p 's credit payment (denoted by Cr4). Cr4 and Re4 are calculated in formula (23) and formula (24), respectively. Specifically, more prolonged delivery time T 4 w brings greater reputation punishment Re4.
3) CASE 5 AND CASE 6
The incentive scheme also allows a forwarding mission to be transferred between different kinds of SPs. Especially, to promote delivery reliability, it encourages that a forwarding mission is transferred from a second kind SP to a first kind SP. In case 5, the SU N p was a second kind SP when it took the mission M i , its desired SP N q is a first kind SP in the current trade, N p wants to transfer M i to N q through a nearby VB. According to the corresponding parameters of the desired SP N q : T iq , Re q , T i , D 1 iq and Re 1 i , and the historical parameters of N p which have been packed in
, the VB can perform the incentive scheme.
In case 5, due to N q is a first kind SP and more reliable to accomplish mission M i than N p , the incentive scheme gives N p credit payment (denoted by Cr5) and reputation reward (denoted by Re5). Cr5 is proportional to the distance that N p has travelled after taking the mission, which can be calculated in formula (25) . Re5 is related to the credit sacrificed by N p and the delivery time reduced by N q , which can be calculated in formula (26) .
If a mission is transferred from a first kind SP to a second kind SP, this mission transferring behavior will get reputation punishment for impairing delivery reliability.
In case 6, the SU N p was a first kind SP when it took mission M i , its desired SP N q is a second kind SP in the current trade, N p wants to transfer M i to N q through a nearby VB. According to the corresponding parameters of the desired SP N q : V iq , Re q , V i , D 2 iq and Re 2 i , and the historical parameters of N p which have been packed in M i :
In case 6, N p 's mission transferring behavior brings a lower delivery reliability, so the incentive scheme gives N p reputation punishment (denoted by Re6) and credit deduction (denoted by Cr6). Cr6 and Re6 are calculated in formula (27) and formula (28), respectively.
Re q (27) 
From formula (27) and formula (28), we can see that if N q has a greater travelling speed and higher reputation, N p will get less credit deduction and reputation punishment.
In case 1 and case 3, the incentive scheme stimulates a relay node to transfer its mission to another relay node that could reach or move close to the mission's destination faster, with the reputation compensation related to its sacrificed benefit, which can finally reduce the delivery delay.
In case 2 and case 4, the incentive scheme can limit the mission transferring behaviors that could prolong the delivery time or increase the deliver cost, with reputation punishment.
In case 5 and case 6, to promote the delivery reliability, the incentive scheme encourages a forwarding mission to be transferred from a second kind SP to a first kind SP with reputation promotion, and conversely limits the mission transferring from a first kind SP to a second kind SP with punishment.
After a relay node taking a mission, it may want to change its transiting route but does not want to transfer its unfinished mission on its current route. In this situation, if it can not arrive at the mission's destination subarea on time, it will get punishment in the mission's destination subarea.
C. REWARD AND PUNISHMENT IN DESTINATION SUBAREAS
When a first kind SP arrives at a forwarding mission's destination subarea, it needs to report this mission to the VB of the destination subarea. For example, after a first kind SP N p arriving at M i 's destination subarea A i , it has to report this mission to the VB of A i , then the VB will perform the incentive scheme to N p according to its corresponding historical parameters:
Furthermore, if T F ≤ T 0 iq , which means N p accomplishes the mission M i on time, this situation is defined as case 7. In case 7, the incentive scheme will give N p credit payment Cr7 that is proportional to the distance N p has travelled after taking M i (denoted by D F ), and reward N p reputation promotion Re7 that is related to the delivery time and distance it has reduced. Cr7 and Re7 are calculated in formula (29) and formula (30), respectively.
If T F > T 0 iq , which means N p breaks the contract of the mission M i due to delay, this situation is defined as case 8. In case 8, the incentive scheme will make N p 's credit payment
Cr8 conversely proportional to its final delivery time and give N p reputation punishment Re8 that is related to the delivery time and distance it has prolonged. Cr8 and Re8 are calculated in formula (31) and formula (32), respectively.
When a second kind SP takes a mission and reaches a subarea on its transiting route that is most close to the mission's destination subarea, it also needs to report this mission to the VB of the subarea. Here, the subarea on the SP's transiting route that is most close to the mission's destination subarea is defined as the mission's temporary destination subarea. For example, after a second kind SP N p arriving at M i 's temporary destination subarea (denoted by A T i ), it has to report this mission to the VB of A T i , then the VB performs the incentive scheme to N p according to N p 's corresponding historical parameters:
, which means N p accomplishes the mission on time, this situation is defined as case 9. In case 9, N p will get credit payment Cr9 that is proportional to the distance N p has travelled after taking M i , and obtain reputation promotion Re9 that is related to the delivery time and distance it has reduced. Cr9 and Re9 are calculated in formula (33) and formula (34), respectively. 
From case 7 to case 10, it can be seen that, if a node does not transfer its mission and accomplishes the mission by itself, it will not get reputation promotion, unless it can reach the mission's destination subarea (or temporary destination subarea) earlier. Thus, under the pressure of reputation attenuation, a node tends to transfer its missions to other more qualified nodes for getting reputation promotion.
To avoid a relay node breaking a contract for discarding its mission, a delivery time threshold is configured in the system of VBs (denoted by T t D ), If a mission is not accomplished within the threshold time, the last SP taking the mission will be checked and recorded as a malicious node by the system of VBs. The malicious nodes are forbidden in HITM.
D. REPUTATION ATTENUATION MODEL
To stimulate nodes to persistently join in HITM, we use the reputation attenuation model proposed in [17] . In the reputation attenuation model, for a node, if its reputation promotion or punishment in the n th trade is denoted by Re(n), the reputation attenuation rate is represented by λ, and the time gap between the (n−1) th and n th trade is denoted by T , the reputation value after the n th trade is denoted Re(n), which can be calculated as:
E. ENCRYPTION AND CLEARANCE
After each trade, the corresponding forwarding mission is encrypted with the parameters of its relay nodes, by its corresponding VB. And before each trade, the corresponding forwarding mission needs to be decrypted. The packet architecture of the forwarding mission is configured like the layered coin model in [17] . After transferring a forwarding mission, an intermediate SU cannot get its credit payment and reputation promotion VOLUME 5, 2017 until this mission is accomplished. In other words, all intermediate relay nodes can get their payment from the system of VBs only when the forwarding mission they have served reaches its destination subarea.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. EXPERIMENT SETTINGS
We evaluate HITM through trace-driven experiments with datasets from the MIT Reality project [23] (97 nodes) and the Haggle project [24] (98 nodes). In these experiments, we set an initial period for nodes to collect daily routine information and generate their DRTs. After the initial period, packets are generated evenly and delivered from source nodes to destination nodes randomly.
In these experiments, the time threshold T t W for a VB searching first kind SPs and the delivery time threshold T t D are set as 3 minutes and 12 hours, respectively, as shown in Table 3 .
In Table 3 , we also define another three simulation parameters: 1) the total number of packets generated in every 12 hours (denoted by N p ); 2) the percentage of selfish nodes (denoted by ρ); 3) the coefficient ratio of β to α (denoted by γ ). We evaluate HITM with different kind SPs. HITM with only the first kind SP is defined as HITM1, and HITM with both the first and second kind SPs is denoted as HITM2.
In the experiments, we compare HITM with PI [17] and Multicent [13] , in the following three aspects: 1) the hit rate: the percentage of the source nodes successfully deliver data to their destination subareas; 2) the average delay: the average time cost by the source nodes to deliver data to their destination nodes; 3) the average transmission overhead: the average number of memory unit used by each node.
B. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 1) THE HIT RATE
At first, we set the percentage of selfish nodes ρ and the coefficient ratio γ as 10% and 1, respectively, and change the number of packets N p from 5000 to 25000 to observe its effect on hit rate. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show that: in both Haggle dataset and MIT dataset, the hit rate decreases with the packet number increasing. The results in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 also reveal that, in both of the two datasets, the hit rate in HITM is higher than that in all other methods, which means that the incentive scheme in HITM is more beneficial for hit rate promotion. As described in previous sections, the incentive scheme in HITM can not only stimulate nodes to transfer their missions to other more qualified nodes, but also limit the mission transferring behaviors that could impair delivery reliability, which is the reason why HITM can greatly promote the delivery rate.
Furthermore, by comparing the hit rate curves of HITM1 and HITM2 in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , it also can be seen that, with the increase of packet number, the hit rate of HITM2 is not always higher than that of HITM1, which means that the second kind SP in HITM2 is not always helpful for the hit rate promotion, because of its lower delivery reliability.
To find out the effect of percentage of selfish nodes ρ on hit rate, we set the number of packets N p and the coefficient ratio γ as 15000 and 1, respectively, and then vary the percentage of selfish nodes ρ. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show that: the hit rate falls down as the percentage of selfish nodes ρ goes up, and the hit rate in HITM is higher than that in all other methods, in both Haggle dataset and MIT dataset.
By further comparing the hit rate curves of HITM and other methods in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 , we also find that, the percentage change of selfish nodes has less effect on PI and HITM but more effect on Multicent, which means PI and HITM have greater resistance to selfish nodes. In other words, HITM and PI can more effectively limit node selfishness, because both of them configure the reputation of nodes to attenuate over time, thereby forcing nodes to get reputation promotion via cooperation for survival in the trade model.
To observe the effect of coefficient ratio on hit rate, we set the number of packets N p and the percentage of selfish nodes ρ as 15000 and 10%, respectively, and vary the coefficient ratio γ . Via theoretical analysis, it can be inferred that, in the system of VBs, if the coefficient ratio γ is greater, the coefficient α must be lower than coefficient β, which means that there is less reputation compensation for nodes' benefit sacrifice. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show that: in both MIT dataset and Haggle dataset, the hit rate decreases as the coefficient ratio rises up. Thus, the experiment results in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 exactly verify that the less reputation compensation is not conductive for hit rate promotion.
2) THE AVERAGE DELAY
To observe the effect of packet number change on average delay, we set the percentage of selfish nodes ρ and the coefficient ratio γ as 10% and 1, respectively, and vary the number of packets N p . Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show that: in both Haggle dataset and MIT dataset, the average delay raises as the packet number increases. And in both the two datasets, HITM has lower average delay than other methods. The lower delivery delay in HITM can be explained by at least two reasons: 1) the DRT can help the VBs to quickly find out nodes that have greater possibilities passing by or moving close to the destination subareas; 2) the incentive scheme in HITM can stimulate nodes to transfer their missions to other nodes that can reach or move close to the destination subareas faster.
Another important result is that HITM2 has lower average delay than HITM1, which proves that the second kind SP is helpful for further reducing the delivery delay. In HITM, the second kind SP can avoid a SU waiting too long when it can not find a first kind SP.
To find out the effect of percentage of selfish nodes on average delay, we set the number of packets N p and the coefficient ratio γ as 15000 and 1, respectively, and vary the percentage of selfish nodes ρ. Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show that: in both MIT dataset and Haggle dataset, the average delay increases as the percentage of selfish nodes increases, and the average delay in HITM is lower than that in all other methods.
The change tendency of average delay in Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show us that, the same number increment of selfish nodes causes different average delay increase in different methods. Specifically, it brings more increase in Multicent, but less increase in HITM and PI, which again proves that the reputation attenuation model in HITM and PI can effectively limit node selfishness.
To observe the effect of coefficient ratio on average delay, we set the number of packets N p and the percentage of selfish nodes ρ as 15000 and 10%, respectively, and vary the coefficient ratio γ . Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show that: in both MIT dataset and Haggle dataset, the average delay decreases as the coefficient ratio goes up. This trend exactly proves that the greater coefficient β is more conductive for average delay reduction. Thus, if the system of VBs wants to pay more attention on average delay reduction, it can set a greater γ .
3) THE TRANSMISSION OVERHEAD
To observe the effect of number of packets on average transmission overhead, we set the percentage of selfish nodes ρ and the coefficient ratio γ as 10% and 1, respectively, and change the number of packets N p from 5000 to 25000. Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 show that: in both Haggle dataset and MIT dataset, the average transmission overhead increases with the packet number increasing.
The most important result in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 is that, in both the two datasets, the transmission overhead in HITM is higher than that in all other methods, which means that HITM achieves the higher hit rate and lower delivery delay at expense of higher transmission overhead. The higher transmission overhead in HITM is mainly caused by the nodes' frequent communication with VBs and DRT update.
Furthermore, by comparing the transmission overhead of HITM1 and HITM2, it also can be seen that, the transmission overhead of HITM2 is close to that of HITM1, which means the introduction of the second kind SP has weak effect on the transmission overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to promote the delivery rate and reduce the transmission delay in DTNs, a Hybrid Incentive Trade Model (HITM) is proposed, which uses reputation compensation to stimulate nodes to sacrifice their temporary benefits and transfer their forwarding missions to other more qualified nodes. Furthermore, HITM gives credit payment and reputation promotion to nodes whose mission transferring behaviors are capable of reducing delivery delay or promoting delivery reliability and punishes the mission transferring behaviors impairing hit rate or prolonging delivery delay.
To evaluate the performances of HITM, we conduct tracedriven experiments and compare HITM with PI and Multicent from three aspects: the hit rate, the average delay and the transmission overhead. The comparison results demonstrate that HITM has advantages in success rate promotion and transmission delay reduction, but at the expense of more transmission overhead. We also explore the effect of the number of packets, the percentage of selfish nodes and the coefficient ratio on the performances of HITM, which will provide a guideline for practical applications.
Our current work is mainly focusing on the method to promote the success rate and reduce the transmission delay in mobile networks. One possible future research direction is to design energy efficient routing protocols [25] , [26] and node tracking methods for mobile networks [27] , [28] . 
